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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C. CUTLER ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, arnd 
Respondent on Cross-Appeal 
-vs.-
DeJA Y STORES, Inc., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant 
Case No. 8163 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT, 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Coillrt below. 
Plaintiff in its brief has set forth the lease upon 
which the case is based and has also set out its version 
of the facts. In the main, the defendant agrees with the 
statement, but not with the conclusions interspersed 
therein, and there have been some omissions. 
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On page 11 of plaintiff's brief: 
"that Bradley-Badger stored some merchan-
dise in the store, but no rent was paid by them." 
This short state~nent by plaintiff disregards the 
eviction of defendant and the taking possession of the 
premises by the plaintiff shortly after July 25, 1952, 
which was the date the defendant vacated the store 
(R. 49). 
Let's look at the record: 
"Q. And did you permit Badger-Bradley to 
store any merchandise in these premises during 
this period of time ~ 
"A. Yes, they stored some things ; not much. 
"Q. And that arrangmnent took place short-
ly after the defendant vacated these premises, did 
it not~ 
"A. It wasn't long after." (R. 51) 
The plaintiff has listed in its brief six points, and 
for the sake of clarity, the defendant will answer the 
arguments on the points as they appear in plaintiff's 
brief. After that the defendant, as cross-appellant, will 
present its one point upon which its cross-appeal is 
based, that is, that the trial court erred in awarding the 
plaintiff $300.00 for damages to plaintiff's premises (R. 
164). 
'( 
I 
I 
I 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SUS-
TAINING THE OBJECTION TO THE QUESTION 
WHICH IS SET OUT IN PLAINTIFF'S POINT 1. 
Harold G. Cutler, president and general manager 
of the plaintiff corporation, was asked if he had receiv-
ed a hid for the repair of the :building, to which he re-
sponded that he had received one bid. He was then ask-
ed what was the amount of that bid. ( R. 78) The lower 
court sustained the objection to the question upon the 
ground that it was hearsay. 
Nichols' Applied Evidence, Vol. 3, page 2436: 
' 
"Testimony on knowledge gained solely frmn 
a letter or a statement received from another is 
hearsay. 
''The ultimate test as to whether a statement 
is hearsay is whether the witness may be cross-
examined concerning the fact about which he 
testifies." 
The writers have examined with interest the in-
sert from Jones Commentories on Evidence, 2d ed., Vol. 
2, page 1325. There is no question as to the statement 
cited in their brief on page 20, however, the citation nor 
any part of it implies that hearsay evidence may be used 
to prove what a com.petent man would charge for that 
service. The competent man should have been subpoe-
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naed, testified and subjected himself to cross-examina~ 
tion. We will quote from Jones Commentaries on Evi-
dence, 2d ed., Vol. 2, page 1325, the paragraph just pre-
ceding that quoted by the apepllant: 
"Personal service. (In General). With regard •, 
to personal service rendered without any agree-
ment as to the amount to be charged for them, 
inasmuch as the law implies that they are to be 
paid for at a reasonable rate, it is manifest that 
some means must exist for giving evidence of that 
rate to the court. The mode of conveying it has led 
to several nice distinctions, for while the plain-
tiff may produce testimony of the nature of the 
service and the necessary qualifications for it and 
the value put upon it by witnesses competent to 
estimate its worth, bare evidence of usual or 
probable charges, by others or the plaintiff him-
self, leads to collateral issues and renders such 
testimony inadmissruble. 
"The proper method is to produce evidence 
of the price which a competent man would charge 
for that particular service, or has charged for 
similar services." 
See: 31 C. J. S., page 919, et seq. 
The plaintiff has not been able to show that t h e 
hearsay answer called for came within the exceptions to 
the hearsay rule. Mr. Cutler was not asked if he was fa-
miliar with what the cost of repairs would be. The ques-
tion did not call for Mr. Cutler's knowledge; it merely 
called for a hearsay statement n1ade to him by a third 
party, and naturally it was inad1nissable· when objected 
to upon the grounds of hearsay. 
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State Bank of Beaver Co. v. Hollingshead, 
25 P(2) 612, 82 U. 416; 
Eaglin v. Earl Eagle Mining Co., 
184 P. 190, 5-± U. 572. 
The plaintiff failed to prove any damage to the 
building by any competent evidence. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND WAS 
JUSTIFIED IN ITS FINDING NO. 7, THAT IN SEP-
TEMBER,, 1952, THE PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED AND 
TOOK POSSESSION OF SAID DEMISED PREMIS-
ES FOR ITS SOLE USE AND PURPOSE. 
On July 25, 1951, the plaintiff was served with a 
written notice (Exhibit D-2) whereby the defendant 
tendered possession of the leased premises to the plain-
tiff and returned the keys of said premises to the plain-
tiff (R. 49). Shortly thereafter, according to the testi-
mony of Harold G. Cutler, plaintiff's president and gen-
eral manager, the plaintiff permitted Badger-Bradley 
Company to store merchandise on s a i d premises rent 
free; it leased said premises to a political organization 
for a period of ten days from October 20, 1952, to N ovem-
ber 4, 1952; it placed ''For Lease" signs in the front store 
windows of the premises ; it advertised said premises ''for 
rent" in Salt Lake City newspapers; and it leased the 
premises for a period of five years to Badger-Bradley 
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Company at a rental of $575.00 per month commencing 
May 1, 1953, anJ possession was given to the new lessee 
on March 1, 1953. All of the' foregoing, according to Mr. 
Cutler, was done without any notice to defendant and 
without the latter's knowledge or consent (R. 50-51). 
Under the authorities this constituted a surrender 
as a matter of law, thereby discharging the lessee defend-
ant from further liability under the lease. We quote from 
Tiffany on Real Property, 3d ed., Section 962: 
"A second mode of surrender by operation of 
law, and one which frequently occurs, results from 
the relinquishment of possession by the tenant 
and the resumption of possession by the landlord. 
The theory of such surrender would seem to be 
that the, reverting of possession in the landlord 
to the exclusion of the tenant, by the action of 
both parties, being inconsistent with the contin-
uance of an outstanding leasehold in the tenant, 
both are estopped to assert that the relation of 
landlord and tenant still exists. It is immaterial 
whether such change of possession is the result 
of agreement. The tenant may relinquish posses-
sion to the landlord in accordance with an agree-
ment to that effect, but more frequently the 
change of possession occurs as a result of the 
abandonment of the premises by the tenant and 
the subsequent resumption of the possession I 
thereof by the landlord." 1 
See also: 
Enoch C. Richards v. Libby, (_l\Iaine ), 10 
Atl. (2) 609; 126 ALR 1215; 
Baker v. Eilers Music Co. (Dist. Ct. of 
App., Calif., 1915) 146 P. 1056; 
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Rehkoph v. \Virz (Calif. 1916), 161 
P. 285; 
Willis v. Kronendonk, 58 U. 592, 200 
P. 1025; 
Casper Natl. Bank v. Curry (Wyo.) 
65 P(2) 1117. 
The Utah Supreme Court, In the case of Willis v. 
Kronendonk, supra, cited with approval the California 
cases, and stated: 
"Assuming, however, t h a t there had been 
1nerely an abandonment of the pre1nises by the 
defendant, then the result, in view of the undis-
puted facts, \Vould still have to be the same. As 
pointed out in the case cited from California, 
where a tenant abandons the premises, and the 
landlord unconditionally goes in t o possession 
thereof and treats them as though the tenancy 
had expired, it amounts to a surrender, and the 
landlord cannot thereafter recover any rent, nor 
sue for damages. If he desires to reserve that 
right, he must recognize the tenant's rights in the 
premises for the unexpired term, and sue hhn for 
damages upon his breach of covenant to pay rent. 
This, however, is elementary doctrine." 
A very recent case, Roger Belanger, et al. v. Lester 
Rice, ________ U. --------, ________ P () --------, Case No. 8125 in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, this court held a 
surrender took place where the lessor accepted a new 
tenant for a period of eight days and lessee paid the ad-
vertising costs. 
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The foregoing mnply justify the court's Finding No. 
7, that plaintiff accepted and took possession of said de-
mises premises for its sole use and purposes in Sep-
tember, 1952. The defendant urges that the court could 
have found that the surrender took place on July 25, 
1952, the date plaintiff accepted the keys and posses-
sion of said premises. That the plaintiff took possession 
and exercised exclusive dominion thereof shortly after 
July 25th is admitted. The trial court apparently con-
strued the statement, ''shortly thereafter,'' as meaning a 
lapse of the period of time extending from July 25, 193:2, 
to September 30, 1952, and awarded plaintiff a judgment 
for rents at the rate of $400.00 a month for the 1nonths 
of July, August and September. 
POINT III. 
T HE TRIAL C 0 U R T WAS JU1STIFIED IN 
FAILING TO FIND THAT DEF·ENDANT AGREED 
TO REMAIN OBLIGATED TO PAY THE RENT ON 
THE D·EMISED PRE1IISES UNTIL A NEW LEASE 
COULD BE RECEIVED. 
The claim that plaintiff should recover on some 
promise or assurance or agreement to remain obligated 
to pay the rent on the premises until a new lease could 
be obtained was not urged in the pleadings, nor did 
plaintiff request a finding to that effect. It is a new 
theory cast into the case after it had left the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court. 1Ir. Solomon, a witness, testified 
as is material to the this point: 
I I I 
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"A. The purpose of the conference was to 
advise :Mr. Harold Cutler, President of the John 
C. Cutler Association, that DeJ'ay Stores were in-
terested in negotiating a new lease and location at 
317 South Main Street, and that they had been 
conducting a business at 36 South :Main Street at 
a loss; that they had purchased certain fixtures 
from the Salt Lake Knit which Mr. Cantor repre-
sented were paid for and belonged to DeJay 
Stores, and that they wanted to move these fix-
tures to their new location at the earliest possi-
ble date, but 1\fr. Cantor advised ~lr. Cutler that 
they in no way intended to discontinue recogniz-
ing their responsibility on the lease, and the pay-
ments would he made in accordance with the 
terms of the lease." (R. 103) 
"The conclusion of the visit that we had was 
that it was satisfactory with the Cutlers for De-
Jay Stores to move to the new location, and Mr. 
Harold Cutler expressed a willingness to help us, 
cooperate in seeing if we could find another ten-
ant, a sub-tenant, a sublease of the property, and 
I repeat that I had no impression that DeJ ay 
Stores in any way considered they were getting 
out of their lease; they had every intention of tak-
ing the responsibility of making the payments, 
and so advised Mr. Cutler." (R. 10-t) 
The above conversation was prior to the time that 
plaintiff took possession and effected surrender of the 
property. (See defendant's argument under Point 2.) 
This appears to be immaterial. The plaintiff sued on the 
lease and not on any promise, direct or implied. The evic-
tion of the defendant shortly after July 25, 1952, relieved 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
the defendant of all written promises contained in the 
lease, and naturally all oral and implied promises claim-
ed by the plaintiff. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT Vv AS JUSTIFIED IN RE-
FUSING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF DAMAGES FOR 
$1,725.00, REAL ESTATE BROKER'S COMI\IISSION. 
The court found in its Finding No. 7 (R. 164) that 
there had been a surrender in September, 1952, and that 
the plaintiff had taken possession of the premises. It 
naturally follows that from then on the defendant owed 
the plaintiff no duty whatsoever, either as to payment 
of rentals or expense in securing new tenants. 
POINT V. 
TI-IE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN RE-
FUSING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF JUDG I\1:ENT 
FOR RENTALS AFTER SEPTEI\fBER, 1952. 
Under this point the plaintiff has urged, as it did in 
its argument (plaintiff's brief, pages 16-18), that the de-
fendant had no right to defend this action because of the 
provisions of Section 16-8-3, Utah CoO.e Annotated, 1953, 
on account of defendant's failure to comply with Sec-
tions 16-8-1 and 16-8-2, U. C. A. 1953. 
The plaintiff's brief plays upon the word, "transac-
tions." Plaintiff has quoted cases that in the defend-
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ant's opinion have no bearing on the situation. Plaintiff's 
contention that it is entitled to practically a default judg-
ment is not upheld by this court: 
Clawson v. Boston Acme J.Vlines Development 
Co., 72 U. 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A.L.R. 1318: 
"The Utah statute, section 947, only prohibits 
a noncomplying corporation from prosecuting or 
maintaining any action, suit, counterclaim, or 
cross-complaint in any court of the state. It does 
not prohibit such corporation from defending an 
action brought against it." 
The court goes on to say: 
"There is much force in the contention of ap-
pellant that to deprive even a foreign corporation 
of the right to defend against an action brought 
against it would savor strongly of unconstitution-
ality. We doubt if that would be true as to the de-
fense of the statute of li1nitations, but even as to 
such defense, it would seem that such corporation 
is entitled to it, where there is no express statute 
withholding the right." 
11he above case was quoted and followed with ap-
proval in the case of Ea.rle v. Froedtcrt Grain & Maltin,g 
Co. (Sup. Ct. Wash., 1938), 85 P(2) 264. 
Yol. :2:3, Am. Jur., page 313: 
"Such a statute does not prevent the corpor-
ation from defending an action brought against it 
in the state courts, unless, as in some jurisdictions 
the statute contains a provision expressly prohib-
iting it from defending in any suit." 
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Of interest also is Heyl v. Beadel (Sup. Ct. 
Iowa, 1940), 29-1 N. \V. 335, 130 A.L.R. 
994 and annotation. 
POINT VI. 
r:rHE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING 
TO AWARD JUDGl\lENT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
FOR $600.00 FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
As stated in plaintiff's brief, page 3:2, it was stipu-
lated that the court determine the amount of attorneys' 
fees to award plaintiff without calling witnesses. This 
stipulation was suggested by the attorney for plaintiff 
and acquiesced in by the attorney for defendant (R. 77). 
The court fixed the fees at $300.00. That the court is an 
expert in his own right to determine fees requires no 
bolstering of authority. The court could accept or re-
ject the testimony of experts as to the value of the serv-
ices of an attorney. It seems incongruous that the plain-
tiff should request the court to make the detennination 
of the attorneys' fees, and then object because it felt it 
should receive twice as 1nuch. There is certai~ly noth-
ing in the record that suggests that $300.00 is an abuse of 
discretion by the court. 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A\VARDING 
THE PLAINTIFF $300.00 F 0 R DAMAGES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PRE1'.1ISES (R. 164). 
I } 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
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As appears frmn the argument on Point 2 in this 
brief, there was absolutely no competent evidence upon 
which the court could find that the plaintiff had suffer-
ed damage to its property in the sum of $300.00 or any 
other smn. This arbitrary figure of $300.00 was not sup-
ported by the evidence of any witness and it would have 
been so easy had the plaintiff really suffered damage, to 
have brought in any number of competent witnesses to 
inform the court as to the amount of damage, if any had 
been done to plaintiff's premises. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant feels that it has fully answered 
plaintiff's brief, and that this court should sustain the 
findings of the lower court in every particular, except 
as to the $300.00 awarded to plaintiff for damage to the 
premises, which was the basis of defendant's cross-ap-
peal, and as to that $300.00 award, the lower court's 
judgment should be reversed, and that the defendant 
should be awarded its costs. 
Respectfully submitted. 
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN 
RAYS. McCARTY 
Attorneys for Reszwndent 
and Cross-Appellant. 
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